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JUDICIAL RECOGNITION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A RIGHT
TO TREATMENT FOR INSTITUTIONALIZED JUVENILES
I. Introduction
Why is it not the duty of the state, instead of asking merely whether a boy
or girl has committed a specific offense, to find out what he is, physically,
mentally, morally, and then if it learns that he is treading the path that leads
to criminality, to take him in charge, not so much to punish as to reform,
not to degrade but to uplift, not to crush but to develop, not to make him
a criminal but a worthy citizen.:
These sentiments, expressed by Judge Julian Mack sixty-five years ago, were
a reaffirmation of the precepts upon which the juvenile court system was founded
-to provide youth with regenerative treatment rather than subject them to the
punitive and debilitating influence of the adult criminal system. The intervening
sixty-five years have shown that our juvenile system is not accomplishing its
avowed goals. In view of some of the recent revelations of conditions and
practices in our juvenile correctional institutions,' there is reason to wonder
whether they are any different from the prisons that Judge Mack and the other
reformers fought to keep our youth out of.
Recently, in the case of Nelson v. Heyne,3 a United States Court of Appeals
recognized for the first time that a constitutional right to treatment exists for in-
stitutionalized juveniles. In this and several recent district court decisions that
recognized a right to treatment,' the judiciary has armed itself with a tool to
force compliance with the basic tenets of the juvenile court system. This note
will examine the recognition, meaning, and impact of the phrase "the right to
treatment."
II. Historical Background
A. The Juvenile Court System-Treatment as Its Goal
Established by statute first in Illinois in 1899, the juvenile court system now
exists in every state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.5 At the turn of
the century children were being given long prison sentences and were being ware-
housed with hardened criminals. The social reformers were convinced that this
idea of crime and punishment, as used in the adult criminal system, was not the
position society should take in dealing with its youth. "The child was to be
'treated' and 'rehabilitated' and the procedures, from apprehension through
1 Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HAv. L. Rpv. 104, 107 (1909).
2 See, e.g., This Child Is Rated X, NBC News White Paper on Juvenile Justice, Broad-
cast May 2, 1971; Hearings on Juvenile Confinement Institutions and Correctional Systems
Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the
Judi iary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
3 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974).
4 Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973) ; Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp.
451 (N.D. Ind. 1973); Martarela v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 '(C.D.N.Y. 1972).
5 In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967).
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institutionalization, were to be 'clinical' rather than punitive."6 Thus, the system
was originated as essentially a civil process with treatment and rehabilitation as
its foundation and its avowed goal.'
The constitutionality of the juvenile court acts of the states has been chal-
lenged often.' In each instance the constitutionality of the act has been upheld,
precisely because treatment and rehabilitation, rather than punishment, were the
purpose of the legislation. When faced with a challenge to the constitutionality
of the Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Act, the court in Commonwealth v. Fishers
emphasized the treatment orientation of the statute:
The objection that "the act offends against a constitutional provision
in creating, by its terms, different punishments for the same offense by a
classification of individuals," overlooks the fact, hereafter to be noticed, that
it is not for the punishment of offenders, but for the salvation of
children. .... 10
The concept that incarcerated juveniles have a constitutional right to treat-
ment has had a parallel development in the mental health area where the theory
was first applied." The argument in favor of a right to treatment is the same in
both fields and can probably best be expressed through the words of the court in
Wyatt v. Stickney, 2 the leading mental health case: "To deprive any citizen of
his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane
therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very
fundamentals of due process."'" Thus, if the state is to confine a person without
the due process protections of the criminal system on the theory that he will be
treated, that confinement is a violation of due process if the treatment is not
forthcoming. The development and recognition of the right to treatment for the
mentally ill have been thoroughly dealt with elsewhere and lie beyond the scope of
this note. 4
B. Pre-recognition Juvenile Cases
The Supreme Court has never ruled on the question of whether there is a
guaranteed constitutional right to treatment for those youths who come within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. Several times within the last decade, how-
ever, the Court has confronted the issue of whether certain procedural safeguards
6 Id. at 16.
7 For a fuller treatment of the history of the juvenile court system, see Paulsen, Kent v.
United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 167.
8 See, e.g., S* * * * S**** v. State, 299 A.2d 560 (Me. 1973) ; Wissenburg v. Bradley, 209
Iowa 813, 229 N.W. 205 (1929); In Re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 96 P. 563 (1908); Common-
wealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905).
9 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905).
10 Id. at 50, 62 A. at 199.
11 For an analysis of this parallel development, see Bailey and Peyfer, Deprivation of
Liberty and the Right to Treatment, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 519 '(1974).
12 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
13 Id. at 785.
14 See, e.g., Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of Civilly Committed Mental
Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 HAv. L. Rav. 1282 (1973); Note, Persons In Need of




normally required by the due process clause must be incorporated into juvenile
court proceedings. Faced with this issue and with the juvenile justice system for
the first time in Kent v. United States,"5 the Court, through Mr. Justice Fortas,
expressed its concern as to the effectiveness of the system:
There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the
child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children.'0
The Supreme Court was now faced with the problem of deciding whether to
implement the protections of the adult criminal system or to try to salvage the
juvenile system.
In In Re Gault' the Court opted for the latter alternative and decided to
balance the implementation of adult procedural rights with the requirements of
treatment."8 Therefore, the Court has taken the approach of determining, assum-
ing treatment is being given, whether the implementation of the procedural right
will interfere with that treatment. This has been the continued philosophy of the
Supreme Court in its subsequent decisions involving juvenile court procedures-
In Re Winship ' and McKeiver v. Pennsylvania?°
A number of juvenile cases over the last twenty years have considered the
right to treatment indirectly in response to conditions of confinement. In doing so
the courts have emphasized that treatment and rehabilitation are the goals of the
juvenile justice system and that confinement of a juvenile in an adult correctional
institution which is punitive by nature is a contravention of these objectives. 21
Perhaps the first case of this type was White v. Reid. 2 The court in White held
that a juvenile who had not been waived by the juvenile court and tried as an
adult could not properly be held in jail. Although the decision was based on stat-
utory grounds, the court voiced its opinion that confinement of a juvenile in any
institution whose facilities are intended for punishment rather than "guidance,
care, education and training" may be in violation of fundamental constitutional
safeguards. 3 The White decision and similar cases show an increasing awareness
15 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
16 Id. at 556.
17 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
18 Id. at 21. The Court determined that adequate written notice be afforded the child
and his parents; that the child and his parents must be advised of their right to counsel; that
the privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to juvenile proceedings; and that in these
proceedings the juvenile has the rights to confrontation and cross-examination.
19 397 U.S. 358 (1970) '(Proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at the adjudicatory
stage when a juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an
adult.)
20 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (A jury trial is not constitutionally required at the adjudicatory
stage of a juvenile proceeding.)
21 See, e.g., Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972)
(where conditions of confinement are anti-rehabilitative, use of the structure violates equal
protection and due process); Baker v. Hamilton, 345 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Ky. 1972) (com-
mitments of juveniles to the county jail, even for a limited period of time, are a violation of
the fourteenth amendment); Kautter v. Reid, 183 F. Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1960) (juvenile cannot
be detained in the district jail unless under an indictment charging him with committing a
crime at a time when he was more than eighteen years old).
22 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954).
23 Id. at 650.
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of the problems faced by institutionalized youth.
A case that illustrates the attitude of the judiciary towards finding a right to
treatment for juveniles is M. U. M. 24 In discussing the juvenile court acts which
allow the courts to place juveniles in correctional institutions, the court says:
If these statutes are viewed thusly, we must also be prepared to hold
that they create a vested right. That once jurisdiction is taken, that infant
has a right to treatment rather than a liability to be subject to it. The dif-
ference is not in semantics but rather in a positive expectation as opposed to
negative defeatism.
2 5
Although it is statutory tight that is being dealt with here, the strong language of
the court clearly illustrates the judicial awareness of the need for a return to the
ideals upon which the juvenile court system was founded.
III. Judicial Recognition of the Right to Treatment
As the preceding discussion has shown, the courts have recognized that the
purpose of the juvenile court system is different from that of the criminal court
system and have not been unwilling to grant relief where the action complained
of violated the precepts of the juvenile justice system by providing bare incarcera-
tion rather than rehabilitative treatment. These decisions have not addressed
themselves to the basic question of whether there is a constitutionally guaranteed
right to treatment for juveniles which places duty on the state to provide treat-
ment. Within the last two years several decisions have indicated that the answer
to that question is in the affirmative.
An important matter to consider initially is the phrase chosen by a court to
describe the tight that the juvenile is asserting. Is the right in question considered
to be a "right to rehabilitation," a "tight to treatment," or a "tight to rehabilita-
tive treatment"? It can be argued that the second two phrases are broader and
more in line with what the originators of the juvenile court system had in mind.
In Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck"6 the court seemingly recognized a
constitutional tight to treatment based on the fourteenth amendment by saying
that "due process in the juvenile justice system requires that the post-adjudicative
stage of institutionalization further this goal of rehabilitation.'2 ' In recognizing
the tight as one of "rehabilitation," the Affleck court may not have made the best
choice of words. Although the court may have meant the same thing as others
who use the term "treatment," it seems potentially dangerous to use the word "re-
habilitation" in light of the fact that the same word is bandied about as being the
goal of our prison system. Juveniles, due to the nature of their civil commitment,
are theoretically entitled to something more than prison inmates are. Courts that
are recognizing a right that is of such importance to our juvenile justice system
should be careful to guard against possible misconceptions.
Probably the first case to hold specifically that institutionalized juveniles
24 336 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1972).
25 Id. at 307.
26 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
27 Id. at 1364 (emphasis added).
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have a constitutional right to treatment was Martarella v. Kelley.25 The plain-
tiffs2 in Martarella alleged that incarceration in maximum security detention
under conditions which are punitive, hazardous, and unhealthy, and in the
absence of rehabilitative treatment, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and
a violation of due process. In responding favorably to this allegation, the court
recognized a constitutional right to treatment for long-term detaineess3 :
[H]owever benign the purposes for which members of the plaintiff class are
held in custody, and whatever the sad necessities which prompt their deten-
tion, they are held in penal condition. Where the State, as parens patriae,
imposes such detention, it can meet the Constitution's requirement of due
process and prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment if, and only if,
it furnishes adequate treatment to the detainee.31
In developing its recognition of this right for juveniles, the court discussed the
historical evolution of the right and seemed to place a good deal of emphasis on
the Supreme Court's excursions into the juvenile justice systems2 and on the
recognition of a right to treatment for the mentally ill.
Although the Martarella court makes a strong fourteenth amendment justi-
fication for the right to treatment,'- the fact that the court also recognizes it as an
eighth amendment right is somewhat puzzling. The court makes use of the
Robinson u. California5 rationale that punishing an individual for his status (in
this case, "person in need of supervision" or "juvenile delinquent"3" ) rather than
for a crime can only withstand the eighth amendment's proscription of cruel and
unusual punishment if there is a curative program. The two amendments not
only provide different bases for the right to treatment but also have significantly
different scopes and standards. A remedy fashioned under eighth amendment
criteria is by its very nature more limited than one based on the broader proscrip-
tions of the fourteenth amendment. This concept becomes dear in the Martarella
court's later opinion detailing final relief.3 ' In ruling as to what constitutes long-
term detainment so as to activate the right to treatment, the court says:
28 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
29 The plaintiff class in Martarella was Persons In Need of Supervision (PINS). Section 712
of the Family Court Act of New York classifies the types of youths who may be brought under
its supervision into two groups, Persons In Need of Supervision and Juvenile Delinquents.
PINS are generally children who are truants, runaways, or are ungovernable at home-generally
those whose conduct is not criminal in nature. JD's are those whose acts, if committed by an
adult, would have constituted a crime.
Since the plaintiff class in Martarella consisted solely of PINS, the question naturally
arises whether the court intends the constitutional right to treatment to extend only to this
classification. This does not seem to be the case, in light of the fact that the court
also held there to be no bar to combining the two classes during institutionalization. 349 F.
Supp. at 595. The court made its intention that the right apply to both groups clear in its
later opinion detailing final relief. In a footnote to its opinion the court pointed out that the
improvement for PINS should not be at the expense of JD's by diverting personnel to one group
exclusively. Martarella v. Kelley, 359 F. Supp. 478, 481 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
30 In its later opinion the court defines detention for thirty days or more as long term.
359 F. Supp. at 482.
31 349 F. Supp. at 585.
32 See discussion in text accompanying notes 15-20 supra.
33 See discussion in text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
34 349 F. Supp. at 600.
35 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
36 See note 29 supra.
37 Martarella v. Kelley, 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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In doing so we must remember that the Eighth Amendment does not impose
on the States the requirement of furnishing the best possible service for those
in custody nor of adhering to the highest professional standard. The office of
the Eighth Amendment is to assure that custodial conditions are minimally
acceptable-that is, not cruel or unusual.38
Thus, using an eighth amendment justification for the right to treatment could
be a poor course. First, the eighth amendment may be an unsound theoretical
basis for enforcing a right which demands significant affirmative action. Secondly,
the eighth amendment may be quite limited as to the types of relief that can be
provided. There seems to be a greater degree of flexibility in a fourteenth amend-
ment justification since the fourteenth amendment is not restricted in fashioning
relief to assuring that custodial conditions are "minimally acceptable."
Following closely on the heels of Martarella was the district court determina-
tion in Nelson v. Heyne 9 that juveniles incarcerated at the Indiana Boys' School
have a constitutionally guaranteed right to treatment. In a class action the
plaintiffs-inmates seeking declaratory and injunctive relief-charged that the
general operation of the school violated their constitutional right to treatment
and additionally challenged certain institutional practices and policies as being
violative of various constitutional safeguards.'
Perhaps the most notable aspect of the Nelson court's consideration of the
treatment issue is that it makes no reference to the application of the right in the
mental health field or to the earlier juvenile cases that dealt indirectly with the
right to treatment. Instead, it stresses the approach taken by the Supreme Court
in its decisions as to what due process standards are required at the adjudicative
stage of juvenile proceedings.41 The Nelson court then goes on to say:
In light of the Supreme Court's prior holdings, it would be anomalous
to find treatment and rehabilitation of an offender as relevant goals during
pre-dispositional phases of the juvenile process but not as to the post-disposi-
tional period. Treatment and rehabilitation represent, in this Court's view,
a continuum measured by the period of time the juvenile offender remains
in the state's custody.
Accordingly, we now hold that plaintiffs are entitled to a right to treat-
ment under the laws of the State of Indiana and the Federal Constitution.42
The Nelson case is quite significant in that the operation of the institution in
general was attacked and found to be in violation of the plaintiffs' right to treat-
ment. For this reason the case is somewhat distinguishable from Martarella,
Affleck, and the earlier cases which focused, in part, on the fact that specific
practices of the institutions were in violation of the rehabilitation and treatment
38 Id. at 481 (emphasis added).
39 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972).
40 Specifically, the use of corporal punishment, the use of tranquilizing drugs, the use of
solitary confinement, mail censorship, and freedom of religion. The consideration of these issues
is not within the scope of this note.
41 See discussion in text accompanying notes 15-20 supra.
42 355 F. Supp. at 459. The court's recognition of a state statutory right to treatment was
based on its interpretation of the Indiana Juvenile Court Act, IND. CODa § 31-5-7-1 (1971).
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goals of the juvenile justice system. The Nelson court was faced with the de-
termination of whether a treatment plan in operation at the institution provided
constitutionally acceptable treatment. In deciding that the defendants were not
fulfilling their duty, the court stated that "the defendants' program of treatment
appears to be more form than substance.""3 The court's decision that the de-
fendants' plan as a whole was constitutionally inadequate established that the
right to treatment was now more than a label to be used in attacking specific
institutional or adjudicative practices. Results were now being considered, and
an affirmative duty was placed on the juvenile justice system to make good on
the promises of the last seventy-five years.
The most recent district court determination of a constitutional right to
treatment was entered in the case of Morales v. Turman." The court there was
faced with a class action by plaintiffs who alleged that certain practices of the
Texas Youth Council, where juvenile inmates were physically abused, were in
violation of the constitutional and civil rights of the youths. Relying on Nelson,
Affleck, and Wyatt, the court concluded that, since juveniles are committed
"under conditions and procedures much less rigorous than those required for the
conviction and imprisonment of an adult offender," they enjoy a federal consti-
tutional right to treatment based on the fourteenth amendment. 5 Like the court
in Nelson, the Morales court found the right to have a state statutory basis as
e],46
well.4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently became
the highest court to pass on the question of whether there is a constitutional right
to treatment for involuntarily committed juveniles.47 In affirming the district
court decision in Nelson, the court held that "the plaintiff juveniles have the right
under the 14th Amendment due process clause to rehabilitative treatment." 4
With this determination there can be no doubt that involuntarily incarcerated
youths have joined the ranks of the mental health patients and others who are
entitled to treatment because of the nature of their commitment.
IV. What Is "Treatment"?
Throughout this note liberal usage has been made of variations of the phrase
"right to treatment." The courts in the last few years have recognized it to be a
right constitutionally guaranteed to incarcerated youths. But what have juveniles
gained through this recognition? What is the meaning of the term "treatment"?
A. The Dual Aspect Approach of Nelson and Martarella
The early social reformers who worked for the establishment of the juvenile
court system intended rehabilitative treatment to be its goal. One such reformer
43 Id. at 460.
44 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973).
45 Id. at 175.
46 Id. at 174.
47 Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974).
48 Id. at 360.
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and commentator on the juvenile justice system was Judge Julian Mack, who
visualized the juvenile institution in the following manner:
What is needed is a large area, preferably in the country,.., laid out on the
cottage plan, giving opportunity for family life, and in each cottage some
good man and woman who will live with and for the children. Locks and
bars and other indicia of prisons must be avoided; human love, supplemented
by human interest and vigilance, must replace them.49
Though sixty-five years have shown that most of Judge Mack's ideals have been
forgotten, his philosophy is evident in the juvenile court acts of our states. These
acts define the duty of the state to be one of providing the care and guidance that
should ordinarily be provided by the youths' parents in their homes."
This concept of providing the care and guidance that the parents should
have given seems to be the philosophy underlying the recent decisions recogniz-
ing the right to treatment. The courts, however, have looked upon the concept
as containing a dual aspect in arriving at their definitions of treatment. Judge
Kiley expressed the dual purposes of treatment in the Seventh Circuit's affirmance
of Nelson51 :
In our view the "right to treatment" includes the right to minimum
acceptable standards of care and treatment for juveniles and the right to
individualized care and treatment. Because children differ in their need for
rehabilitation, individual need for treatment will differ.
52
Under this approach, treatment would require the state to provide for its youth
in two ways in order to satisfy its constitutional duty. First, it would have to
provide a minimum standard of general care such as would be provided by the
juveniles' parents. This would include food, clothing, shelter, education, and
basic medical care-those things for which children have a common need.5
Second, this definition of treatment would require the state to provide an affirma-
tive treatment program that would meet the individual needs of the youth. Such
a program would include psychiatric and psychological services to deal with
diagnosed individual problems, medical treatment for identified disabilities and
illnesses, and special education to correct specific educational deficiencies. 4
At the present time Martarella v. Kelley" is the only case in the juvenile field
to have issued its final order detailing a treatment plan. The Martarella court's
plan has as its basis the same concept that Judge Kiley..later espoused in Nelson;
that is, that the state is obligated to provide both the general care that all youths
need and the individualized care and treatment that the particular youth needs:
49 Mack, supra note 1, at 114.
50 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-5-7-1 (1971).
51 The court was not faced with the question of what constitutionally adequate treatment
is. That was still to be determined by the district court and the Seventh Circuit remanded
for this purpose.
52 491 F.2d at 360 (emphasis in the original).
53 See Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law: A Treatment Plan,
Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972).
54 Id.
55 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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"Treatment" is defined as a therapeutic living situation for a child, in-
cluding his grouping with other children; the adequacy and competency of
staff members dealing with him or his case; diagnosis of his emotional and
psychological needs and on the basis of such diagnosis and all other informa-
tion about the child that is available, . . . the provision of appropriate
mental health, case work, educational, recreational and medical services
for him.
A child confined to a secure detention facility shall be afforded treat-
ment appropriate to his individual need .... 56
In setting forth its treatment standards according to this definition, the Martarella
court places a great deal of emphasis on the use of the staff at the institution.
Specific standards are detailed in regard to educational qualifications of staff
members, staff training programs, procedural requirements in dealing with the
admission of juveniles to the institution, staff-juvenile ratios, and staff duties as
to the implementation of individualized treatment programs. 7 This emphasis on
the institutional staff seems to be the result of the belief, expressed by the court
in its earlier opinion, that the success of any treatment program is dependent for
the most part on the existence of a good relationship between the youth and the
members of the institution with which he comes into contact."'
By defining the right to treatment as they did, the Seventh Circuit and the
court in Martarella have announced that the juveniles' right to treatment guar-
antees more than that the conditions of confinement be humane. Both decisions
have brought the concept of the right to treatment beyond the limits it had in
the earlier cases when it was discussed in the context of an eighth amendment
attack upon specific institutional practices.5 9 An affirmative duty is now placed
on the states to provide individualized care and guidance to the youths it in-
stitutionalizes.
B. The Need for Psychiatric and Psychological Services
One aspect of the right to treatment which has been given a great deal of
attention by the courts is the need to upgrade individual treatment through
better utilization of psychiatric and psychological services. This is not strictly a
modem concept. The early social reformers believed that "in the behavioral
sciences and the medical arts there was a body of scientific information which, if
applied to an erring child, could work beneficial change in him."6° The courts
that have recently recognized a right to treatment seem to agree, for they all have
emphasized the need to make the use of psychiatric and psychological counseling
an integral part of individualized treatment programs.
The trend of the courts to focus on the need for improvements in the
psychiatric and psychological services seems to be due at least in part to reports of
the manner in which emotionally disturbed youths are treated in juvenile institu-
tions. The court in Affieck states:
56 Id. at 484.
57 Id. at 483-86.
58 349 F. Supp. at 586.
59 See discussion in text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
60 Paulsen, supra note 7, at 170.
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There is evidence, and I so find, of at least two probable suicide attempts by
boys who received no medical or psychiatric care proximately following the
attempts. The response of BTS supervisors to these suicide attempts was
solitary confinement."'
Similarly, in Nelson it was reported that during fifty-seven consecutive days of
solitary confinement one of the plaintiffs mutilated himself on three different oc-
casions and on each occasion was returned to confinement without receiving
recommended psychiatric treatment. 2
In response to situations such as these and because psychiatric and psycho-
logical services are often needed in order to insure adequate treatment for in-
carcerated youths, the Affleck court granted plaintiffs' request that defendants
supply an appropriate and adequate psychiatric counseling program. Although
the district court in Nelson has yet to rule on what it believes to be the constitu-
tionally required mandates of treatment, it seems evident from the language of
its earlier opinion that the court considers the use of psychiatrists and psychol-
ogists to be indispensable to a regenerative treatment program. Even though
there were three psychologists and a part-time psychiatrist on the staff of the
Indiana Boys School, the court was concerned that they were not being properly
utilized. 3
The importance of utilizing these services is also reflected in the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Nelson. The court left to the district court the decision of
what treatment standards are required, "having in mind that the juvenile process
has elements of both the criminal and mental processes."" This language is
significant in that in a footnote to this sentence the court quotes from a law review
note to the effect that treatment in both processes relies "heavily upon the medical
services, especially psychiatry and psychology.""5 Though they were relying on
the district court to determine exactly what is constitutionally mandated in the
way of treatment, it seems that the Seventh Circuit wished to inform the district
court that they believed psychiatric and psychological services should be part of
that mandate.
Thus, in arriving at a definition of treatment, it seems that the courts look
upon it as the duty of the state to provide the general care and guidance that all
youths need as well as the individualized treatment that the particular juvenile
requires. Further, the judiciary seems to have taken the position that the pro-
vision of psychiatric and psychological services is an essential element in this
definition.
61 346 F. Supp. at 1359. For a description of another particularly disturbing incident
where psychiatric help was sorely needed but was not forthcoming, see id. at 1360.
62 355 F. Supp. at 455-56.
63 Id. at 460. The Nelson court makes light of the fact that counselors spend more than
half of their time on paperwork rather than dealing interpersonally with inmates; that the
limited time commitment of the staff psychiatrist confines him to short-term crisis intervention
rather than the management of individual psychotherapy programs; and that the staff psychol-
ogists are not certified by the state, do not hold graduate degrees, and spend most of their
time supervising intake behavior classification.
64 491 F.2d at 360.





A. Is This an Area for the Judiciary?
Up until the last decade the courts were unwilling to interfere in the area of
postsentencing and postcommitment conditions. 6 The cases discussed in this note
have shown that the judiciary has recently taken an active interest in assuring
adequate care for institutionalized juveniles. There are those, however, who
believe that the adoption and implementation of treatment standards are not
proper court functions. The argument is made that the formulation of treatment
standards should be left to a quasi-legislative commission rather than "catch-as-
catch-can inspections and prickings by courts of justice."6
The court in Martarella: addressed itself to the question of whether treatment
standards are an appropriate matter for judicial concern. Although aware of the
view that it is "generally undesirable (both for the courts and the institutions)
that courts should administer institutions," the court felt that a specific order
was necessary nonetheless.68 The opinion points out that court specification of
standards for care "is no longer novel and has been recognized as the appropriate
dispositional method by an increasing number of Federal Courts in cases involv-
ing disadvantaged institutional inmates."6 9 The court seems concerned also with
the fact that these institutions have had a history of ignoring reports and recom-
mendations that have urged reform and improvement of facilities. While recog-
nizing the limitations placed on institutional administrators, the court proceeds
on the presumption that if relief does not come from the courts it may not come
at all. Addressing itself specifically to the assertion that the court was overstep-
ping its bounds and assuming an executive and legislative function, the Martarella
opinion answers that "[i]t is the job of courts to decide issues. This is particularly
true when we are dealing with the rights of children growing up in the difficult
conditions of modem urban life."'
The court in Martarella is thus far the only court to have set out constitu-
tionally mandated standards of treatment for juveniles. The courts in Morales
and Nelson will do so in the near future and for this reason it appears that the
judiciary views such a determination as being within the scope of the courts.
B. A Clockwork Orange?
Assuming that the courts continue to recognize a right to treatment for
juveniles and to adopt constitutional standards of treatment, there is still another
problem that may remain. There is a concern with whether the courts will be
able to insure effective treatment through these standards or whether they will
66 For an excellent discussion of the history of judicial restraint as far as the examination
of institutional conditions see Rothman, Decarcerating Prisoners and Patients, 1973 CIvIL
LmE.Tms Rv. 8.
67 Xittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the juvenile Process? 57 GEo.
L.J. 848. 881 (1969).
68 359 F. Supp. at 482.
69 rd. at 483.
70 349 F. Supp. at 602.
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merely be prescribing limitations that do little to prevent abuses under the name
of "treatment." David Rothman, in discussing the new institutions that are and
will be opening, states the problem:
Undoubtedly, each will have a large staff of professionals, an elaborately
designed program, and dedicated and articulate directors. And using these
criteria, the courts will turn away constitutional attacks. From all past in-
dications, judges will focus not on performance, not on whether the institu-
tions actually do any good, but on external criteria, on the size of the staff
and style of the directors, on whether the institution promises to do good.
7 1
Rothman and others suggest that if this is the approach taken by the courts we
may be opening the door to possible destructive uses of treatment. They warn
that negative reinforcement and the deprivation of institutional freedoms (for
example, food, visitations, or goods) may be used in attempts to program be-
havior. 2 The concern that they express is that if the courts focus on external
criteria rather than positive results, practices such as these may be condoned on
the premise that they are necessary for therapeutic treatment.
The degree to which this possibility can be seen as a matter of concern
depends of course on the approach the courts take in their implementation of
treatment standards. In Martarella the court places a good deal of emphasis on
what Rothman describes as "external criteria?' in setting forth its treatment stand-
ards. s The court does, however, retain jurisdiction over the action to permit pos-
sible modifications as they become necessary. This may be one way to deal with
the abuses of treatment that some people fear.
The district court opinion in Nelson may be a major step in closing the door
on the theory that any attempt at treatment will be judicially recognized as treat-
ment. In Nelson the court, to a degree at least, did what Rothman was con-
cerned courts would not do--it focused on performance when it determined that
the defendants' treatment plan appeared to be "more form than substance."
7 4
By ruling that a treatment plan adopted and implemented by a juvenile cor-
rectional institution did not meet constitutional standards, the court has shown
there to be another avenue through which effective treatment may be insured.
The argument can also be made that the eighth amendment could be
utilized by the courts as a protection against the use of negative reinforcement
and similar abuses practiced in the name of treatment. 5 Regardless of whether
the courts would choose to use the eighth amendment or to use the approach of
the Nelson court in dealing with these practices, it appears in any event that we
are forced to place a great deal of faith in the judiciary's ability to insure effective
treatment for incarcerated youths.
71 Rothman, supra note 66, at 25.
72 See, e.g., id. at 24; Malmquist, Juvenile Detention: Right and Adequacy of Treat-
ment Issues, 7 LAw & Soc'' Rav. 159, 180-81 (1972).
73 See, e.g., 359 F. Supp. at 483-86.
74 355 F. Supp. at 460.
75 An example of this approach is the Nelson court's finding that practices such as beatings,
improper use of tranquilizing drugs, and certain uses of solitary confinement are in violation of




The recognition of a constitutionally guaranteed right to treatment for
incarcerated juveniles will hopefully insure for the nation's youth that which was
promised them seventy-five years ago. Mere recognition of the right is not
enough. Effective treatment standards must be promulgated and implemented.
Strict supervision of these standards and the flexibility to modify as needed are
essential if positive results are to be forthcoming.
The courts have demonstrated that they consider the implementation of
measures designed to secure adequate treatment for juveniles to be an area of
judicial concern. In light of the continued reluctance of the legislatures to make
any meaningful attempts to deal with correctional problems, this would appear
to be the proper, if not the only, approach for the courts to take. In doing so the
courts must be concerned with more than whether the institutions seem adequate
on the surface; they must take steps to guarantee that positive results are
produced. This requires more than recognition and implementation; it requires
that courts retain jurisdiction in order to supervise the adequacy of treatment. If
this is done, perhaps we can envision the day when the number of youths who
graduate from our juvenile correctional institutions only to flood our prisons will
be drastically reduced.
Bill Brift
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